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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in approving an award of punitive damages 
without any finding that compensatory liability was based on tort, without a prior finding 
of punitive damage liability, and when compensatory liability had been tainted by 
introduction of wealth evidence. 
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming an award of attorney fees for 
all of plaintiffs' claims, even though the legal basis for the verdict cannot be determined, 
most of the claims were unsuccessful, and the fee award is based only on defendant's 
counterclaim. 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The court of appeals opinion is reported as Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 
383 U.A.R. 9 (Utah App. 1999), as set forth in the Appendix. (App. 1.) 
JURISDICTION 
A. The court of appeals decision was entered December 2, 1999. 
B. On January 3, 2000, this Court entered an order extending the time for filing 
this petition to February 3, 2000. 
C. This Court has jurisdiction of this petition pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2(3)(a) 
and (5). 
CONTROLLING LEGAL PROVISIONS 
Determination of the legal issues is governed in part by U.C.A. §§ 78-18-l(l)(a) 
and (2) and 78-27-56.5, which are set forth verbatim in the Appendix. (App. 51-52.) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This dispute arises out of plaintiffs' lease and operation of defendant's 
recreational properties in southern Utah. Defendant suspended the lease after 
discovering plaintiffs' misappropriation of funds. Plaintiffs thereafter sued defendant, 
alleging various contract and tort claims. Defendant asserted contract and tort 
counterclaims. At the close of trial, the jury rendered a general verdict, awarding ^-
plaintiff Dejavue compensatory damages in the amount of $90,871. The verdict did not ~ 
specify whether liability was based on contract or tort. Neither did the verdict contain 
any question or finding of liability for punitive damages. Nevertheless, the court directed 
the jury to retire a second time to consider an award of punitive damages. The jury 
returned a punitive verdict of $62,500. The court subsequently awarded attorney fees of < 
$91,668, even though it admittedly could not determine whether the verdict was based on 
contract or tort, and without reduction for unsuccessful claims. 383 U.A.R. at 9; (R. 1, 
i 
110, 1385-86, 1662-63). 
The court of appeals affirmed. Regarding punitive damages, the court of appeals 
I 
upheld the award, even though it conceded that the tort or contract basis for liability 
could not be determined. The court found no need for a prior finding of punitive damage 
liability because defendant failed to object to the district court's procedure at trial. The i 
court upheld the award of attorney fees on the sole basis that plaintiffs prevailed on 
defendant's contract counterclaim. However, the court upheld fees for all of plaintiffs' 
i 
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claims, even though the basis for plainnn \ crdict cannc; u .leteimin 
plaintili ••-• - ; : '* • 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts material to the legal issues presented aic not in dispute. 
Defendant. U.S. Energy Corp., owns and operates a mobile home park,, 
C \.-r)>. L >• ^ -" ' 
May - l)(H. I !,S. Lnergy leased the restaurant and lounge to plaintiff Dejavue, Inc., which 
is ow ned and controlled by plaintiffs Allison Nord and Krislinc Schullz. Soon thereafter, 
the parties agreed that plaintiffs would also manage 1:1K monik home park, store, and 
motel 383 1 J < \ R ; H .9. , (R 558 91. 842 891-905) 
Ii I Febn lai y 1996, , • dispi ites arose between the parties over management of tl ic 
properties and accounting for various funds and revenues. The parties terminated their 
business relationship,, and this action followed 383 U A R at 9; (R. 17u~h < 
5v - i 
I J t : ' ! I - I M . ' i • •• l ' ihle entn inlawflil detainer, 
conversion, misrepresentation, trespass, intentional infliciion -1 emotional distress, and 
unjust enrichment (R 52,2.) I J.S. Energy asserted a counter^ taim. >:<-eginu, In- "acli ot 
ciiiiiliJi 1 nul \ .n inns, ii mil ijaiiii'. I \i 8,'iln i \\ (I n,: i U IM in! I'udcnu1, (II11J cast \ ,i!-
submitted to tl ic: : ji n y c u I general \ erdict forms, w ith no provision -4 * * J,:L ! between 
tort and contract liability, and with no question regarding liability for punitive damages. 
The jury returned a general verdict in favor of plaintiff Dejavue, assessing compensatory 
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damages in the amount of $90,871. (R. 1385); 383 U.A.R. at 9. There was no finding of 
liability for punitive damages and no demonstration that compensatory liability was 
based on tort rather than contract. 
The trial should have ended right there, but it did not. The district court then 
informed the jury that it could also award punitive damages. (Tr. 1323-1324.) The court * 
gave three jury instructions on punitive damages, and then sent the jury out to consider ~ 
punitive damages, with a modified general verdict form that read only: "We, the jury . . . — 
find the issues in favor of the plaintiff Dejavue and award punitive damages . . . against - *'• 
the defendant in the sum of $ ." (R. 1386.) Again, there was no question 
regarding any basis for punitive damage liability. Plaintiffs' counsel then referred the 
jury to Exhibit 91, the annual report that showed U.S. Energy's financial status (which 
had been improperly introduced during the compensatory phase of the trial), and 
requested $300,000 in punitive damages. (Tr. 1325-28.) The jury returned a half-hour 
later, having simply filled in the blank for punitive damages in the amount of $62,500. 
The jury made no express finding that compensatory liability was based on tort, or that 
defendant's conduct justified punitive damage liability. (R. 1386; Tr. 1331); 383 U.A.R. 
at 9. 
Plaintiffs filed a post-trial motion requesting nearly $107,000 in attorney fees, < 
including $67,000 for their lead counsel, Mr. Bugden. The alleged basis for attorney 
fees was the lease contract, and plaintiffs claimed to have prevailed on their contract 
claims. However, the fee request was not apportioned between contract and tort claims. 
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(R. 1388, 1392, 1396.) U.S. Energy challenged the request on the grounds that, given 
the general verdict, it was impossible to determine whether plaintiffs prevailed on their 
contract claim, and most of plaintiffs9 claims were not based on contract. (R. 1464, 
1505, 1559.) In a post-trial ruling, the district court awarded attorney fees, but only for 
actual trial time of lead counsel Bugden on behalf of plaintiff Dejavue. (Tr. of 7/28/98 p. 
4; R. 1524-25.) Despite these express limitations, the district court ultimately awarded 
attorney fees in the amount of $91,669 (R. 1659-60), far more than Bugden's initial fee 
request for all his work on all the claims on behalf of all the plaintiffs. The court 
subsequently entered a final Amended Judgment. (R. 1662); 383 U.A.R. at 9. 
The court of appeals affirmed, upholding the award of punitive damages even 
though "the trial court had no way of knowing under which theory or theories of liability 
the jury awarded its verdict." 383 U.A.R. at 12. The court held that no specific finding 
of punitive damage liability was required because U.S. Energy failed to object to the 
district court's procedure at trial. Id. at 10. The court ignored defendant's argument that 
the procedure was illegal as a matter of law, under U.C.A. § 78-18-1(2). Regarding 
attorney fees, the court held that Dejavue was entitled to fees on all its claims, even 
though the exact basis for liability could not be determined, because Dejavue prevailed 
on U.S. Energy's contract counterclaim. The court held that the attorney fees need not be 
reduced for unsuccessful claims because plaintiffs legal theories were related. However, 
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the court made no finding that plaintiffs legal theories were related to defendant's 
contract counterclaim, which was the sole basis for any fees at all. Id. at 10-11} 
ARGUMENT 
This Court's review is necessary because this case presents important issues of 
state law that either have not been, but should be decided by this Court, or that were ^ i 
decided contrary to prior decisions of this Court. Specifically, the punitive damages -
issue contains elements of first impression, with statewide significance, that should be 
decided by this Court. The court of appeals decision on both punitive damages and 
attorney fees is in conflict with prior decisions of this Court. 
POINT I: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES WHEN THERE WAS NO FINDING 
THAT COMPENSATORY LIABILITY WAS BASED ON 
TORT, NO PRIOR FINDING OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE 
LIABILITY, AND COMPENSATORY LIABILITY WAS 
TAINTED BY INTRODUCTION OF WEALTH EVIDENCE. 
A. Punitive Damages Can Be Awarded Only For Liability Based In Tort 
The law in Utah is well settled that punitive damages cannot be recovered for 
breach of contract, but only for liability grounded in tort. E.g., Cook Associates, Inc. v. < 
Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Utah 1983). In a case alleging both contract and tort 
theories, the verdict must clearly specify a tort basis for liability, otherwise a verdict for 
punitive damages cannot be sustained. Id. at 1168. "If there is doubt whether the 
1
 Actually, the record is not all that clear as to the prevailing party on defendant's contract < 
counterclaim. One of the significant procedural irregularities at trial was the court's directing the jury to 
execute the general verdict form finding for U.S. Energy on its counterclaim, but awarding zero damages. 
The court later claimed error and accorded no significance to that verdict. (R. 1384; Tr. 1321-23, 1332-
33.) 
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general verdict awarded damages for tort, the consequences of that doubt must be 
charged to [the] plaintiff..., who had the burden of requesting special verdicts." Id., 
n.5. Moreover, a plaintiff alleging both contract and tort theories for the same loss 
cannot properly recover on both theories, "since that would represent double recovery." 
Id. at 1168. A verdict must resolve all issues between the parties, otherwise "it is fatally 
defective and such defect is substantial and reversible error." Owens v. McBride, 694 
P.2d 590, 594 (Utah 1984). 
Here, plaintiffs asserted numerous alternative contract and tort claims, yet failed to 
request a special verdict form that would have permitted the jury to designate the basis 
for liability. By failing to request a special verdict, plaintiffs waived their right to a jury 
determination of issues that could have been resolved by such a verdict. Rule 49, Utah 
R. Civ. P.; Cook Associates, supra. Specifically, they waived a right to determination of 
whether liability was based on contract or tort, and of whether defendant's conduct 
manifested the requisite intent to justify punitive damages. 
The general verdict in this case states only that the jury "find[s] in favor of the 
plaintiff Dejavue, Inc. and against the defendant, and assess[es] the plaintiffs damages at 
$90,871." (R. 1385.) The verdict does not specify whether liability is based on contract 
or tort. The district court, in rejecting plaintiffs' claim to prejudgment interest, expressly 
held that the basis for liability could not be determined: 
[T]he Courtis of the opinion that the way the verdict was framed with the--
the general verdict, that it did not break down as to what the damages were 
for This Court has no way of knowing what are special damages or 
what may be general damages. [Tr. 7/28/98, p. 3, App. 27.] 
7 
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The court of appeals agreed that the legal basis for the compensatory verdict cannot be 
determined: 
Because the general verdict form did not identify the specific claims on 
which the award was based, we are unable to determine whether Dejavue 
prevailed on its breach of contract claim 
. . . In this case, the trial court had no way of knowing under which theory 
or theories of liability the jury awarded its verdict. [383 U.A.R. at 11-12.] 
The court of appeals decision upholding the award of punitive damages must be 
reversed because it conflicts with this Court's decision in Cook Associates, Inc. v. 
Warnick, supra. "The verdict for punitive damages cannot be sustained because the 
record does not show an award of compensatory damages in tort to which such punitive 
damages could be ascribed." Cook Associates, supra, at 1168. The consequences of 
doubt regarding the basis for liability must be charged to plaintiffs, "who had the burden 
of requesting special verdicts." Id. Because the general verdict fails to specify that 
compensatory liability is based on tort, the verdict is "fatally defective" as a basis for 
punitive damages, and the judgment based thereon must be reversed. Owens v. McBride, 
supra, at 594.2 
In requesting attorney fees, plaintiffs argued that compensatory liability was based on contract. (R. 
1396.) This further precludes them from claiming, for purposes of punitive damages, that compensatory 
liability was based on tort. Plaintiffs cannot fairly interpret the same general verdict as being based on 
contract for purposes of attorney fees, but based on tort for purposes of punitive damages. The two 
awards are inconsistent and mutually exclusive. 
8 
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B. Punitive Damages Must Be Preceded By A Finding of Punitive Damage 
Liability. 
This Court has long approved a bifurcated procedure for punitive damages in 
which the jury first determines punitive damage liability, i.e., whether the defendant's 
conduct or mental state justifies punitive damages; and if so, the jury determines in a 
second, separate phase the amount of punitive damages to award. The reason for making 
the two determinations separately is to avoid tainting or skewing the liability question 
with evidence of the defendant's wealth. See Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 
817 P.2d 789, 807 n.23 (Utah 1991); Ong International v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 
447,456 (Utah 1993); Annot., "Necessity of Determination or Showing of Liability for 
Punitive Damages Before Discovery or Reception of Evidence of Defendant's Wealth," 
32A.L.R.4th432(1984). 
This procedure is also required by the punitive damages statute, U.C.A. § 78-18-1: 
( l ) (a ) . . . punitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory or 
general damages are awarded and it is established by clear and convincing 
evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful 
and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests 
a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights 
of others. 
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be 
admissible only after a finding of liability for punitive damages has been 
made. [App. 51, emp. added.] 
The procedure followed in this case deviated significantly from the proper 
procedure outlined above. To begin with, as discussed below, plaintiffs improperly 
o 
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introduced evidence of defendant's wealth during the compensatory damage phase of the 
trial. At the conclusion of the compensatory phase, plaintiffs used a general verdict form 
that failed to address in any way the punitive damage liability of U.S. Energy. No 
question was asked whether plaintiffs had proven, by "clear and convincing evidence," 
that defendant's conduct was "willful and malicious." Consequently, the jury made no 
finding of such liability. 
The court of appeals erroneously reasoned that U.S. Energy had a duty to object to 
the district court's procedure and jury instructions, 383 U.A.R. at 10, suggesting at oral 
argument that defendant had the burden to request a special verdict form to establish the 
absence of punitive damage liability. However, as set forth above, the burden was on 
plaintiffs to request a special verdict form in order to establish the existence of punitive 
damage liability. Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, supra, 664 P.2d at 1167-68; Rule 49, 
Utah R. Civ. P. Absent that requisite prior finding, plaintiffs had no right to have the 
jury consider an award of punitive damages at all. U.S. Energy does not dispute the jury 
instructions, but rather the authority of the district court to proceed to a punitive damages 
phase at all when plaintiffs had waived the necessary finding of punitive damage 
liability, and the jury had consequently made no such finding. 
The district court's act of informing the jury that punitive damages could be 
awarded, and then sending the jury out with a single-sentence verdict form that asked 
only how much to award necessarily prejudiced the verdict. Any reasonable juror is 
going to do just as asked and simply fill in the blank with an amount. Again, the court of 
in 
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appeals faulted U.S. Energy for not requesting a liability question on the second verdict 
form, but by then consideration of punitive damages was barred by plaintiffs' own 
failure to request a finding of punitive liability on the first verdict form. Under the case 
law and statute set forth above, it was prejudicial error for the jury to consider both 
punitive liability and amount of punitive damages at the same time. By failing to request 
a determination of punitive liability in the first phase of the trial, plaintiffs were 
precluded from seeking that determination in a second phase, and defendant's failure to 
challenge the second phase was rendered moot. 
In any event, as the court of appeals found support for its conclusion in cases 
involving jury instructions, 383 U.A.R. at 10, this Court, "in its discretion and in the 
interests of justice, may review" the matter, even in the absence of a trial objection. See 
Rule 51, Utah R. Civ. P. See also State v. Beltran-Felix, 922 P.2d 30, 37 (Utah App. 
1996) (appellate court may address manifest violation of statute not raised below); 
Yannuzzi v. United States Casualty Co., 115 A.2d 557, 563 (N.J. 1955) (appellate court 
may justly enforce statutory protection not raised below); MeGarry Bros. v. City of St. 
Thomas, 66 N.W.2d 704, 708 (N.D. 1954) (appellate court will review plain error even 
where statutory protection was not raised below). 
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals conflicts with this Court's 
decisions in Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange and Cook Associates, Inc. v. 
Warnick supra, as well as with the punitive damages statute, 78-18-1(1) and (2). The 
issue of the proper bifiircation procedure may also need to be clarified by this Court as an 
11 
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issue of first impression under the punitive damages statute. See C.T. v. Johnson, 977 
P.2d 479, 486-88 (Utah 1999) (Zimmerman, J., dissenting); Johnson, "Crookston v. Fire 
Insurance Exchange and the Utah Punitive Damage Act: Toward a Sounder Law of 
Punitive Damages" 1993 Utah L. Rev. 513, 540-44. Either way, this Court should grant 
review to correct both the legal error and the injustice of paying punitive damages 
without any prior finding of punitive damage liability. 
C. Compensatory Liability Was Tainted by Introduction of Wealth Evidence. r-
As set forth in section 78-18-1(2), quoted above, "[e]vidence of a party's wealth u, 
or financial condition shall be admissible only after a finding of liability for punitive 
damages has been made." The statute is phrased in mandatory terms, establishing an 
absolute prohibition on evidence of a defendant's wealth until after punitive damage 
liability is established by clear and convincing evidence. Plaintiffs and the district court 
violated this statute by introducing and admitting evidence of U.S. Energy's financial 
condition during the compensatory damage phase of the trial. (Exh. 91, App. 38.) 
The court of appeals excused this error on the basis of defendant's failure to 
object at trial, asserting that the issue was first raised on appeal 383 U.A.R. at 10. 
However, no objection is required to an act that is absolutely prohibited by statute. The 
statute allows no exceptions, such as failure to object; by its terms, the prohibition is 
absolute in every case. In any event, as set forth in Rule 103(d), Utah R. Evid., this 
Court is not precluded from "taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights 
although they were not brought to the attention of the [trial] court." Admission of illegal 
12 i 
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evidence is "plain error" that must be corrected to preserve the intended statutory 
protection, even when not raised at trial. See, e.g., State v. Beltran-Felix, supra, 922 
P.2d at 37; Yannuzzi v. United States Casualty Co., supra, 115 A.2d at 563. Moreover, 
U.S. Energy did raise the issue in its motion for new trial (R. 1541-46), giving the district 
court an opportunity to correct the error. Therefore, the issue was not raised for the first 
time on appeal. 
As set forth in section 78-18-1(2), U.S. Energy has a statutory right to have its 
compensatory liability determined without prejudicial and illegal evidence of its financial 
condition. The issue of whether that right can be waived by inadvertent failure to object, 
even though the violation is later brought to the attention of the trial court, is one of first 
impression that this Court should resolve. 
POINT II: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING 
ATTORNEY FEES FOR ALL OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS, 
WHEN MOST OF THOSE CLAIMS WERE 
UNSUCCESSFUL AND UNRELATED TO DEFENDANT'S 
CONTRACT COUNTERCLAIM, WHICH WAS THE ONLY 
BASIS FOR FEES. 
Attorney fees may be awarded only if authorized by contract or statute. If based 
on contract, fees can be awarded only in accordance with the terms of the contract. Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). A party requesting attorney fees 
in cases involving multiple contract and non-contract claims must "distinguish between 
work done that was subject to a fee award and work that was not." Cottonwood Mall Co. 
v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 1992). Specifically, such a claimant must identify time 
and fees for successful claims for which fees may be awarded, unsuccessful claims for 
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which fees could have been recovered if successful, and claims for which fees are not 
recoverable. Id. at 269-70. Trial courts are expected to apportion fees among multiple 
parties and separate legal claims in order to separate the recoverable fees from the 
unrecoverable. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, supra, at 990. See also Miller v. Martineau 
& Co., 372 U.A.R. 34, 38-39 (Utah App. 1999); Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, -
1393-94 (Utah App. 1994) (denying fees because most related to noncontract claims). & 
In this case, plaintiffs claim a right to attorney fees under section 19.02 of the 
Sublease Agreement, which entitles U.S. Energy to attorney fees expended in recovering 
possession of the premises. (App. 48-49.) However, by the time this action was 
commenced, plaintiffs had already vacated the premises and defendant was in possession. 
Accordingly, U.S. Energy's contract counterclaim does not seek possession of the 
premises, but damages for breach of the contract. (R. 871.) Therefore, under the strict 
terms of the contract, neither party was entitled to attorney fees. The court of appeals 
decision thus conflicts with this Court's prior decisions, cited above, which limit the 
recovery of fees under a contract to the precise terms of the contract. See also Loosle v. 
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 858 P.2d 999, 1003 (Utah 1993) (denying fees for quiet 
title action where note and trust deed provided for fees only in connection with 
foreclosure). 
Even assuming the lease agreement allowed fees for U.S. Energy's breach of 
contract counterclaim, the reciprocity statute, U.C.A. § 78-27-56.5, would allow 
plaintiffs to recover only its fees incurred in defense of that counterclaim. See 
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah App. 1990) (allowing 
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fees "attributable to those claims on which the party was successful"), cited by the court 
of appeals. 383 U.A.R. at 11. Neither the statute nor this Court's case law authorizes 
recovery of fees for plaintiffs' own contract claim or for their multiple tort claims, 
especially when, as shown above, it is impossible to determine from the general verdict 
which claim provided the basis for liability. Plaintiffs' attorney fee affidavit fails to 
apportion fees between successful and unsuccessful claims, and between recoverable and 
nonrecoverable fees, as required by Cottonwood Mall and Dixie State Bank, supra. 
The court of appeals cites only one Utah case in support of its decision, Sprouse v. 
Jager, 806 P.2d 219 (Utah App. 1991). However, that case is easily distinguishable on 
the grounds that the plaintiff was successful on its own contract claims, and its other 
claims were "intertwined" with its own successful contract claims. The federal cases 
cited by the court of appeals are similarly distinguishable. Here, by contrast, plaintiffs 
have not prevailed on their own contract claims. The court of appeals expressly found 
that "we are unable to determine whether Dejavue prevailed on its breach of contract 
claim." 383 U.A.R. at 11. The only basis for recovery of fees is plaintiffs' success on 
U.S. Energy's counterclaim. Id. Accordingly, it is immaterial that plaintiffs' own tort 
claims are related to its own contract claims. The issue, rather, is whether any of 
plaintiffs claims are related to defense of U.S. Energy's counterclaim. Plaintiffs have not 
argued, and the court of appeals did not find, any such connection. 
Therefore, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover any fees other than those incurred 
in defending U.S. Energy's counterclaim. The court of appeals decision awarding 
plaintiffs all of their fees for all of their claims on behalf of all plaintiffs is clearly Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
contrary to this Court's decisions in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken and Cottonwood Mall 
Co. v. Sine, supra. Accordingly, this Court should grant review to correct this legal error 
and injustice. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should grant the petition for writ of certiorari. 
The court of appeals decision on both punitive damages and attorney fees is contrary to 
prior decisions of this Court. Moreover, the issues raised, some of first impression, are 
of statewide significance and likely to reoccur unless settled and clarified here. This case 
provides the Court a favorable opportunity to declare the law on these important issues. 
Respectfully submitted this 3 day of February, 2000. 
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to a second degree felony for intentional or knowing conduct. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2) (1999). 
6. Because we conclude the statute's language is not 
ambiguous, we need not consider the Legislature's intent in 
passing section 76-5-109. See Wilson, 969 P.2d at 418. 
7. We note that our reading of "endangermcnt" is in line with 
other jurisdictions' interpretations of statutes using the term. 
See. e.g., State v. Deskins, 731 P.2d 104, 105-06 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1986); People v. Odom, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1028, 
1032-33 (Cal.Ct.App. 1991). 
Cite as 
383 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DEJAVUE, INC., a Utah corporation; Kristine C. 
Schultz; and Allison Nord, 
Plaintiffs, Appellee, and Cross-appellant, 
v. 
U.S. ENERGY CORP., a Wyoming corporation, 
Defendant, Appellant, and Cross-appellee. 
No. 981772-CA 
FILED: December 2, 1999 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
ATTORNEYS: 
Merrill F. Nelson, Salt Lake City, and Kenneth 
A.B. Roberts, Jr., Denver, Colorado, for Appellant 
and Cross-appellee 
Walter F. Bugden, James E. Morton, Tara L. 
Isaacson, and JeiTery S. Williams, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee and Cross-appellant 
Before Judges Wilkins. Billings, and Orme. 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
WILKINS, Presiding Judge: 
1jl Defendant, U.S. Energy Corp., appeals a jury 
verdict awarding plaintilT, Dejavue, Inc., S90,S71 in 
compensatory' damages, $62,500 in punitive 
damages, and $91,668 in attorney fees. On appeal, 
U.S. Energy claims the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to either grant a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or order a new-
trial. U.S. Energy also attacks the trial court's award 
of attorney fees. Dejavue cross-appeals, claiming the 
trial court erred as a mater of law in refusing to 
award it prejudgment interest on the jury award. In 
addition, Dejavue requests attorney fees on appeal. 
We affirm and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
€\2 U.S. Energy owns and operates a mobile home 
park, convenience store, motel, restaurant and lounge 
in Ticaboo, Utah, approximately ten miles from Lake 
Powell. In May 1995, U.S. Energy subleased the 
restaurant and lounge facilities to Dejavue, Inc. 
(Dejavue), a corporation with two shareholders. 
Allison Nord and Kristine Schultz. Shortly thereafter, 
the parties agreed that Dejavue would also oversee 
the mobile home park, convenience store, and motel, 
for which Dejavue was to receive a $4,000 monthly 
management fee. 
V In February 1996, problems arose between the 
parties, ultimately resulting in the termination of 
Dejavue's lease and the removal of Nord and Schultz 
as managers of the mobile home park, convenience 
store, and motel. Thereafter, Dejavue, Nord, and 
Schultz brought suit against U.S. Energy alleging 
various contract and tort claims. U.S. Energy 
counterclaimed for breach of contract. Before trial, 
Schultz abandoned her claims and therefore they 
were not presented to the jury. 
*4 The case was tried in June 1998. At trial, Nord 
asserted a cause of action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and Dejavue asserted claims for 
breach of contract, forcible entry, unlawful detainer, 
conversion, misrepresentation, and unjust 
enrichment. U.S. Energy asserted a counterclaim for 
breach of contract, misrepresentation, contractual 
I indemnification, and accounting. In order to impeach 
! one of U.S. Energy's witnesses, Dejavue offered into 
evidence U.S. Energy's 1997 Annual Report (the 
report) "to demonstrate that U.S. Energy conducted 
its business practices in a deceptive fashion." The 
trial court admitted die report into evidence without 
objection from U.S. Energy. 
^5 At the close of trial, the case was submitted to 
the jury on general verdict forms, witfi a separate 
general verdict form for Nord, Dejavue, and U.S. 
Energy on its counterclaim. The jury returned one 
signed verdict form, awarding Dejavue $90,871 in 
compensatory damages. Because the jury left the 
general verdict forms for Nord and U.S. Energy 
blank, the trial court instructed the jury foreman to 
enter zero as the amount of damages and sign both 
forms. After the jury returned its compensatory 
award in favor of Dejavue, the jury deliberated again 
and awarded Dejavue $62,500 in punitive damages. 
In post-trial proceedings, the trial court refused to 
award Dejavue prejudgment interest on its 
compensatory damage award, but concluded Dejavue 
was the prevailing party and entitled to attorney fees 
under the sublease agreement. 
€
,6 In August 1998, U.S. Energy filed a motion for 
JNOV, or, in the alternative, for a new trial. U.S. 
Energy argued the trial court erred in admitting U.S. 
Energy's 1997 Annual Report and that the evidence 
was insufficient to support a punitive damage award. 
The trial court denied U.S. Energy's motion, hi 
October 1998, the trial court entered findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and an order awarding Dejavue 
$90,871 in compensatory damages, $62,500 in 
punitive damages, and $91,668 in attorney fees. This 
appeal followed. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
j^7 We address three issues on appeal. First, we 
consider whether the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying U.S. Energy's motion for JNOV or, 
alternatively, for a new trial. When a party 
challenges the sufficiency of evidence underlying a 
trial court's denial of a motion for JNOV or a new-
trial, "we reverse only if, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to die prevailing party, the 
evidence is insufficient to support die verdict.1* 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Ere//., 817 P.2d 789, 799 
(Utah 1991). Furthermore, "the appealing party 'must 
marshal die evidence in support of the verdict and 
then demonstrate that die evidence is insufficient 
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when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict.1" Ifeslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828,839 
(Utah 1992) (quoting Crookston, 817 P.2d at 799). 
*
!8 Second, we address whether the trial court 
correctly awarded attorney fees to Dejavue as the 
prevailing party. Whether attorney fees are 
recoverable is a question of law which we review for 
correctness. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 
305, 315 (Utah 1998). However, the trial court has 
"broad discretion in determining what constitutes a 
reasonable fee, and we will consider^ that 
determination against an abuse-of-discretion 
standard." Dixie Slate Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 
985, 991 (Utah 1988). 
^9 Finally, we address whether the trial court erred 
in denying Dejavue's request for prejudgment interest 
on its compensator}' damage award. We review the 
award of prejudgment interest, a question of law, 
under a correction of error standard. See Andreason 
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). 
ANALYSIS 
I. REFUSAL TO GRANT JNOV OR ORDER 
NEW TRIAL 
^10 U.S. Energy claims two points of error in the 
trial court's refusal to set aside the jury's verdict and 
either grant a JNOV or order a new trial. First, U.S. 
Energy contends that the trial court improperly 
admitted evidence concerning its financial condition 
during the compensatory damages phase of the trial. 
Second, U.S. Energy argues the jury failed to make 
the requisite finding of willful and malicious conduct 
necessary to support an award of punitive damages. 
We address each point in turn. 
A. Evidence of U.S. Energy's Financial 
Condition 
«jl 1 Section 78-18-1 of the Utah Code provides 
that evidence of a party's wealth or financial 
condition is inadmissible until a finding of liability 
for punitive damages has been made. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-18-1(2) (1996). This rule is intended to 
prevent juries from being improperly influenced by 
a parly's wealth in assessing compensatory 
damages-damages which should be based solely on 
losses, not the losinu party's ability to paw See Ong 
Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v.llthAve Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 
456 (Utah 1993). In this case, Dejavue introduced 
U.S. Energy's 1997 Annual Report during the 
compensatory damage phase of the trial, before a 
finding of liability for punitive damages had been 
made. Although the report was offered for 
impeachment purposes, it contained financial 
information regarding U.S. Energy's assets and net 
worth. However, U.S. Energy did not object to the 
admission of the report. It is well settled that issues 
not raised before the trial court are waived on appeal. 
See State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 
1986) (stating in order "[t]o preserve a contention of 
error in the admission of evidence for appeal, a 
defendant must raise a timely objection in the trial 
court"). Because U.S. Energy failed to preserve the 
issue of admission of the report by raising a timely 
objection, we decline to further address this 
argument. 
B. Sufficiency or the Evidence 
112 Because U.S. Energy's challenge to the jury's 
punitive damages award amounts to an attack on the 
sufficiency of the evidence, it "must marshal all 
evidence supporting the verdict" and then show that 
the evidence cannot support the verdict. Von Hake v. 
nomas. 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). "The 
burden on an appellant to establish that the evidence 
does not support the jury's verdict... is quite heavy." 
Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 
(Utah 1987). 
^13 In this case, U.S. Energy has failed to meet 
this.burden. U.S. Energy has not marshaled the 
evidence upon which the jury could have based a 
finding of willful and malicious conduct, nor has it 
argued that this evidence was insufficient to support 
the jury's punitive damage award. U.S. Energy 
ignores evidence that it forcibly removed Dejavue 
from the leased premises, as well as evidence that it 
failed to negotiate the motel management agreement 
in good faith. Finally, U.S. Energy overlooks 
evidence that it converted Dejavue's restaurant 
equipment and used it for two years without 
Dejavue's consent. 
€
914 Instead, U.S. Energy merely states those facts 
most favorable to its position and ignores the 
contrary evidence. This is not adequate. See Promax 
Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247,255 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). We have shown no reluctance to affirm 
the jury's verdict when a party fails to meet its 
marshaling burden. See, e.g., Wright v. West side 
S'ursery, 787 P.2d 508, 514 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Accordingly, we assume the record supports the jury's 
verdict and refuse to consider U.S. Energy's claim of 
insufficient evidence. 
C. Finding of Willful and Malicious Conduct 
* 15 U.S. Energy also challenges what it considers 
to be the trial court's failure to require a specific 
finding of willful and malicious conduct on its part 
by die jury prior, to consideration of the amount of 
punitive damages to be awarded. However, U.S. 
Energy concedes that it failed to object to the 
procedure followed by the trial court in this regard, 
or to object to the jury instructions given by which 
the jury learned of its responsibilities in considering 
the requested award of punitive damages. 
r16 Having failed to object at trial, U.S. Energy 
may not now complain. See lanDyke v. Mountain 
Coin Mack Distribs., Inc., 758 P.2d 962, 964 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) ("If a party fails to object to a jury 
instruction, the objection is deemed waived on 
appeal."). As U.S. Energy also conceded at oral 
argument, the jury instructions given on this issue 
were sufficient to instruct the jury on the law. We 
assume thejurv followed those instructions. See State 
v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880,883 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("hi 
the absence of the appearance of something 
persuasive to the contrary, we assume that the jurors 
were conscientious in performing to their duty, and 
that they followed the instructions of the court." 
(citations omitted)). Accordingly, we find no error in 
the absence of a specific, pre- damages finding by the 
jurv of willful and malicious conduct on thepart of 
U.S. Enersv. 
II. ATTORNEY FEES 
*I7 U.S. Energy also challenges the trial court's 
award of attorney fees to Dejavue as the prevailing 
party. Specifically, U.S. Energy argues; (1) the 
sublease agreement does not provide a basis for 
awarding Dejavue attorney fees; (2) Dejavue cannot 
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establish that it prevailed on a breach of contract 
claim; and (3) in any event, the fees are excessive. 
We disagree. 
A. Sublease Agreement 
^ 18 The sublease agreement between the parties 
specifically provides that in the event of default by 
Dcjavue, U.S. Energy shall have the right to recover 
reasonable attorney fees and costs. Utah law provides 
for the reciprocal right to recover attorney i^cst and 
permits a court to award attorney fees to either party 
prevailing in an action based on a written contract, 
when the contract permits at least one party to 
recover such kcs. See Utah Code Aim. § 78-27-56.5 
(1996). However, "attorney fees authorized by 
contract are awardable only in accordance with the 
explicit terms of the contract." Maynard v. IWiarton, 
912 P.2d 446, 451 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Thus, 
under the terms of the sublease agreement and 
pursuant to Utah law, Dejavue is clearly entitled to 
an award of attorney fees if it indeed prevailed on 
either its own breach of contract claim, or in 
defending against U.S. Energy's breach of contract 
counterclaim. 
B. Breach of Contract Claims 
^ 19 The jury returned a general verdict awarding 
Dejavue $90,871 in compensatory damages. Because 
the general verdict form did not identify the specific 
claims on which the award was based, we are unable 
to determine whether Dejavue prevailed on its breach 
of contract claim. However, with respect to U.S. 
Energy's counterclaim for breach of contract, the jury 
returned a "no cause of action" verdict in Dejavue's 
favor. Thus, although it is uncertain whether Dejavue 
prevailed on its breach of contract claim, Dejavue 
was clearly successful in defending against U.S. 
Energy's breach of contract counterclaim. 
•[20 Where a contract provides the "right to 
attorney fees, Utah courts have allowed the party 
who successfully prosecuted or defended against a 
claim to recover the fees attributable to those claims 
on which the party was successful." 
Occidental/Nebraska Feci Saw v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 
217, 221 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Furthermore, when 
a plaintiff brings multiple claims involving a 
common core of facts and related legal theories, and 
prevails on at least some of its claims, it is entitled to 
compensation for all attorney fees reasonably 
incurred in the litigation. See Henslev v. Eckerhart, 
461 U.S. 424, 435~ 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1940 (1983). 
"However, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, be a 
prevailing party with respect to a portion of the 
litigation in order to receive fees." Stewart v. 
Donges, 979 F.2d 179, 183 (10th Cir. 1992); see 
JaneL. v. Bangerter,6\ F.3d 1505, 1512 (10th Cir. 
1996) ("If claims are related, failure on some claims 
should not preclude full recovery if plaintiff achieves 
success on a signi ficant, interrelated claim."); Durant 
v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 16, 990 F.2d 560, 566 
(10th Cir. 1993) (stating because plaintiffs "claims 
arose out of a common core of facts and involved 
related legal theories, the district court may . . . 
conclude her prevailing party status on . . . [one] 
claim subsumes her failure to succeed [on the 
other.]"); Sprouse v. Jager, 806 P.2d 219,226 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991) ("Because these complex issues were 
so intertwined, we find the court acted within its 
discretion in its award of attorney fees"). 
^21 In the present case, Dejavue successfully 
defended against U.S. Energy's breach of contract 
counterclaim. Accordingly, Dejavue is entitled to 
attorney fees under the sublease agreement. 
Furthermore, Dejavue's contract and tort claims were 
based on related legal theories involving a common 
core of facts. The trial court specifically found that 
the claims advanced by Dejavue, and 
interposed as defenses to the counterclaims, 
were based on inter-related legal theories 
and arose from a common core of facts.... 
• Each of Dejavue's claims submitted to the 
jury was intertwined with its defense of the 
breach of contract . . . counterclaims and 
arose from a common core of facts. 
U.S. Energy does not dispute these factual findings 
and therefore, we accept them as true. See C & Y 
Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d47, 52 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("Because appellants do not 
challenge the trial court's factual findings, we must 
accept this finding as true."). Accordingly, we affirm 
the trial court's conclusion that Dejavue is the 
prevailing party in this case and entitled to "attorney 
fees incurred in presenting all of its legal theories." 
C. Reasonableness of Attorney Fees 
[^22 We now consider whether the fees awarded 
to Dejavue were reasonable. Calculation of 
reasonable attorney fees is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court, so long as the fees are 
supported bv the evidence in the record. See Baldwin 
v.£w/?o//,850P.2dll88,1199 (Utah 1993). Among 
the factors to be considered by the trial court in 
considering the reasonableness of the fee are "the 
extent of services rendered, the difficulty of the 
issues involved, the reasonableness of time spent on 
the case, fees charged in the locality for similar 
services, and the necessity of bringing an action to 
vindicate rights." Id. at 1200. The trial court 
considered these factors, prepared written findings 
supporting its action, and ultimately awarded 
Dejavue slightly less than three quarters of die fees 
it sought. 
*[23 In this case, the trial court's determination 
that die attorney fees awarded were reasonable is 
amply supported by the evidence. Dejavue submitted 
attorney fee affidavits that included detailed billing 
statements. Additionally, Dejavue submitted the 
expert affidavits of three local attorneys specializing 
in civil litigation who attested to the reasonableness 
and necessity of Dejavue's fee request. U.S. Energy, 
in turn, failed to offer any evidence to refute the 
reasonableness of Dejavue's fee request. Because the 
record supports the trial court's award of attorney 
fees, we cannot say the trial court clearly exceeded 
its permitted discretion in awarding Dejavue $91,668 
in attorney fees. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's 
nilins on this issue. 
III. CROSS-APPEAL 
j^24 Dejavue cross-appeals the trial court's refusal 
to award prejudgment interest. Under Utah law, 
prejudgment interest may be awarded to provide full 
compensation for actual loss. See Canyon Countv 
Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d414,422 (Utah 1989). The 
award is proper if the loss is fixed at a definite time 
and the interest can be calculated with mathematical 
accuracv. See Coalville Cit\f v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 
1206,1212 (Utah Ct. App. \ 997). However, because 
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of the lack of mathematical certainty, prejudgment 
interest is typically not allowed in actions seeking 
equitable relief such as unjust enrichment. See 
Shoreline Dev., Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207, 
211 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see also James 
Constructors v. Salt Lake City, 888 P.2d 665, 671 
n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (stat'ing "Utah courts have 
upheld the denial of prejudgment interest in actions 
seeking . . . unjust enrichment"); Bailev-Allen Co.. 
Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 R2d 421, 427 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) (concluding "even if quantum meruit is 
awarded on remand, no prejudgment interest should 
be awarded"). 
T|25 In this case, one of the five causes of action 
Dejavue submitted to the jury was an unjust 
cnriclunent claim. Although the jury awarded 
Dejavue $90,871 in compensatory damages, the 
general verdict form did not identify the specific 
claims on which the award was based. While an 
award of prejudgment interest might well be 
appropriate under the breach of contract claim, such 
an award is highly problematic with respect to the 
forcible entry, unlawful detainer, and conversion 
claims. However, it would never be appropriate for 
the unjust enrichment claim presented here, hi this 
case, the trial court had no way of knowing under 
which theory or theories of liability the jury awarded 
its verdict. Thus, it was impossible for the trial court 
to determine to what extent, if any, the jury's damage 
award was based on Dejavue's unjust enrichment 
claim-a claim which is not subject to an award of 
prejudgment interest. See Shoreline Dev., Inc., 835 
P.2d at 211 (rejecting claim for prejudgment interest 
on unjust cnriclunent award). Under these 
circumstances, because of the lack of mathematical 
certainly, we conclude the trial court correctly denied 
Dejavue prejudgment interest. 
IV. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
U26 Finally, Dejavue, having prevailed below, 
and again on appeal, requests attorney (ccs incurred 
in connection with this appeal. Such an award is 
clearly within the contemplation of the sublease 
agreement. See Management Sen's. Corp. v. 
Development Assocs. ,617 P.2d 406,409 (Utah 1980) 
(ruling provision in contract providing for attorney 
fees includes attorney fees incurred by the prevailing 
party on appeal). Accordingly, we award Dejavue 
reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal, and 
remand for the limited purpose of determining the 
amount of those fees. 
CONCLUSION 
1J27 We conclude the trial court properly denied 
U.S. Energy's motion for JNOV, or, in the 
alternative, for a new trial. U.S. Energy failed to 
object to the admission of the report. Also, because 
U.S. Energy failed to properly marshal the evidence 
supporting the jury's punitive damage award, we 
decline to disturb those findings. Further, we hold 
that under the sublease agreement, Dejavue was the 
prevailing parly and entitled to "attorney fees 
incurred "in presenting all of its legal theories." 
Moreover, we conclude that the trial court's award of 
altomev fees was reasonable and that the trial court 
properly denied Dejavue's request for prejudgment 
interest". Finally, we award Dejavue attorney fees on 
appeal, and remand for a determination of the 
amount of those fees. 
K28 Affirmed and remanded. 
Michael J. Wilkins, Presiding Judge 
}29 I CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
130 I CONCUR, EXCEPT THAT AS TO 
SECTION n(A) & (B), I CONCUR ONLY IN THE 
RESULT: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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ORME, Judge: 
*• 1 Defendant Santos Dominguez, Jr. pled guilty to 
burglary, a second degree felonv, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (19*95). At sentencing, 
defendant was ordered to pay restitution both to the 
victim of his crime ajid directly to the victim's 
insurance company. Defendant appeals the trial 
court's order, but only insofar as it required him to 
pay restitution to the victim's insurance company. We 
affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
«i2 On September 8, 1996, defendant entered a 
mobile home in Ogden, Utah, viciously assaulted a 
minor, then lied the state. The victim underwent 
reconstructive surgery to repair injuries sustained in 
the assault and accumulated $6,847 in medical bills. 
The defendant was ultimately arrested in Phoenix, 
Arizona. On February 11,1998, he was extradited to 
Utah. 
*I3 In exchange for defendant's guilty plea, the State 
agreed to remain silent at sentencing. At defendant's 
sentencing hearing, conducted on April 27, 1998, 
defendant was given a prison sentence of one to 
fifteen years, which was stayed pending defendant's 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEJAVUE, INC., a Utah 
corporation, KRISTINE C. 
SCHULTZ, and ALLISON NORD, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
U.S. ENERGY CORP. 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
a Wyoming 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 960902865CV 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
This action came on for trial before the Court and a jury, 
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Judge presiding, and 
the issues having been duly tried and the jury having duly 
rendered its verdict, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. That the Plaintiff Dejavue, Inc. recover from the 
Defendant, U.S. Energy Corp., the sum of $90,871.00 in 
compensatory damages, with no pre-judgment interest, but the 
compensatory damages shall accrue post-judgment interest, until 
satisfied, at the rate of 7.468% per annum. 
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2. In addition, the jury awarded $62,500.00 in punitive 
damages, which shall also accrue interest at the said judgment 
rate, until satisfied, and shall be distributed in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1(3). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff 
Allison Nord, in her individual capacity, take nothing and that 
the action be dismissed on its merits against her. 
With respect to the Counterclaim of Defendant U.S. Energy, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant U.S. 
Energy take nothing, and that the Counterclaim be dismissed on 
its merits. 
Plaintiff Dejavue, Inc. is the prevailing party and shall be 
awarded its attorneys' fees in the amount of $91,668.69, which 
sum shall accrue post-judgment interest, at the said judgment 
rate, until satisfied by Defendant. 
DATED this X I day of October, 1998. 
BY JHE-COURT: 
/ HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
* Third District Court Judge 
1 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEJAVUE, INC., a Utah 
corporation, KRISTINE C. , 
SCHULTZ, and ALLISON NORD, J 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
U.S. ENERGY CORP., a Wyoming 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER RE: 
Civil No. 
Honorable 
VARIOUS MATTERS 
: 960902865CV 
Homer F. Wilkinson 
Having reviewed Defendant's Request for Stay of Proceedings, 
the stipulation of Plaintiff to the requested stay, Defendant's 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the 
Alternative for a New Trial, Defendant's Position with Respect to 
Plaintiff's Request for Attorney's Fees as the Prevailing party 
(Motion to Reconsider), and all other memoranda submitted by 
counsel on these issues, being fully advised in the premises, and 
good cause appearing, 
IT IS JiEFEBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Defendant's Request for Stay of Proceedings for a Period 
1 
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of 30 Days after the Court's Determination of the Post-Trial 
Motions is hereby granted; 
2. Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict, or in the Alternative for a New Trial, is hereby denied; 
3. Defendant's Position with Respect to Plaintiff's Request 
for Attorney's Fees as the Prevailing Party in the Within Action 
(Motion to Reconsider) is hereby denied; and 
4. Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees in the amount of 
$91,668.69 is hereby granted. 
DATED this J- ( day of October,. 1998. 
BY/THE COURT: 
HOI^ORA^E^HOMg^*. WILKINSON 
T h i r d ' D i - s t r i c t r ^ o u r t J u d g e 
NV? ;3M.-V' y 
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BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Dejavue, Inc. arid 
4021 South 700 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEJAVUE, INC., a Utah 
corporation, KRISTINE C. SCHULTZ, 
and ALLISON NORD, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
U. S. ENERGY CORP., a Wyoming 
corporation, et al. 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO PLAINTIFF 
DEJAVUE, INC. AS THE 
PREVAILING PARTY AND 
RULINGS ON VARIOUS OTHER 
MATTERS 
Civil No. 950902865CV 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
On July 28, 1998, the Court announced its rulings on various 
matters. Walter F. Bugden, Jr.. appeared in person on behalf of 
the Plaintiffs, and Kenneth A. Roberts, participated by telephone 
on behalf of the Defendant. 
Being fully advised in the premises, having reviewed the 
Memoranda submitted by counsel, The Court has ruled and 
determined as follows: 
1. The Court denies Plaintiff Dejavuo, Tnr.'s request for 
pre-judgment interest. 
2. The Court grants Plaintiff Dejavue post-judgment 
interest at the statutory rate of 7.468%. 
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3. Plaintiff Dejavue, Inc. is the prevailing party, and as 
such, is granted an award of reasonable attorney's fees, subject 
to the following: ^ actual trial (as opposed to other litigation-
related) fees shall be awarded only for the time of Dejavue, 
Inc.'s lead counsel, Walter F. Bugden, Jr.; and no fees shall be 
awarded for Mr. Bugden's travel time to and from Riverton, 
Wyoming or Ticaboo, Utah. 
4. Plaintiffs shall be awarded taxable costs authorized by 
law. 
5. Costs shall not be awarded for the following items: 
a. Expert witness charges; 
b. Out-of-pocket expenses for meals and lodging; and 
c. Investigator's charges. 
6. Based upon the guidance provided by the Court in the 
said July 28th hearing, counsel for the parties are encouraged to 
reach a stipulation as to the amount of attorney's fees and costs 
which shall be awarded to Plaintiff Dejavue, Inc. 
7. In the event the parties cannot reach such an 
agreement, Defendant shall file an objection and supporting 
memorandum within ten days of mailing of Plaintiff Dejavue's 
revised fee request and Plaintiff Dejavue shall file any reply 
within ten days of receipt of such an objective. 
8 The Defendant's Motion for Sanctions is denied. 
9. The Court will enter a Judgment in the amount of the 
compensatory damages plus the amount of punitive awarded by the 
2 
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jury. That Judgment will be augmented by the award of attorney's 
fees and costs when that determination is made by the Court. 
DATED this / / &aygti&&&?$p&998 
A l J } . ' ;££••"+Stirs. \ - 7 ^ \ 
THE COURT: 
JORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the Jfr^May of July, 1998, I certify that I caused to be 
mailed in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the Order Granting Attorney's Fees to Plaintiff 
Dejavue, Inc. as the Prevailing Party and Rulings on Various 
Other Matters to the following: 
Kenneth A. Roberts 
The Malo Mansion 
500 East Eighth Avenue 
Denver, Colorado 80203 
Wayne Wadsworth 
1338 Foothill Drive, #275 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEJAVUE, INC., a Utah 
corporation, KRISTINE C. 
SCHULTZ, and ALLISON NORD, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
U.S. ENERGY CORP., a Wyoming 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
1 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE: 
I AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES 
1 TO PREVAILING PARTY 
Civil No.: 960902865CV 
I Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Plaintiff Dejavue's Motion for an Award of its Attorneys' 
Fees and Costs, as the prevailing party in this matter, came on 
for hearing before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on July 28, , 
1998. Walter F. Bugden, Jr. appeared on behalf of Plaintiff, 
Dejavue, Inc., and Kenneth Roberts appeared, via telephone, on 
behalf of Defendant. Having reviewed all relevant pleadings 
submitted by the parties on this issue, the Court granted 
Dejavue's Motion for an Award of its Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 
subject to certain limitations, but did not make a determination 
as to the precise amount to be awarded. 
H U D DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 2 J 1998 
OoputyCtorif 
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The Court urged counsel to reach a stipulation with respect 
to the amount of fees and costs to be awarded to Plaintiff 
Dejavue. The Court further directed counsel that, in the event 
the parties were unable to reach such a stipulation, .Defendant 
should file an objection and supporting memorandum, and Plaintiff 
should file a reply thereto. 
The parties failed to reach a Stipulation regarding the 
amount of fees and costs to be awarded to Plaintiff Dejavue; 
consequently, the parties submitted Memoranda to the Court 
setting forth the parties' respective positions as to the amount 
of fees and costs to be awarded in this matter. The Court having 
received and reviewed all pleadings submitted by the parties on 
this issue, having reviewed all evidence submitted in support of 
said pleadings, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby 
makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
A. BASIS FOR AWARD OF FEES 
1. Plaintiff, Dejavue, Inc. (hereinafter "Dejavue") and 
Defendant U.S. Energy Corp. entered into a written Sublease 
Agreement. 
2. Dejavue brought claims against Defendant for, inter 
alia, breach of the Sublease Agreement. 
3. Defendant brought a counterclaim against Dejavue for 
breach of the Sublease Agreement. 
2 
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4. The terms of the subject Sublease Agreement provide that 
the landlord (Defendant) shall be able to recover its attorneys 
fees and costs incurred in, inter alia, recovering damages 
arising from a breach of the Sublease Agreement. 
5. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5 provides in relevant part 
that a court may award costs and attorneys' fees to either party 
that prevails in a civil action based upon a written contract, 
when the provisions of the written contract "allow at least one 
party to recover attorney's fees." 
6. At trial, the Jury found in Dejavue's favor with respect 
to its claims against Defendant and awarded Dejavue $90,871.00 in 
compensatory damages and $62,500 in punitive damages. 
7. With respect to Defendant's counterclaim for breach of 
the Sublease Agreement, the Jury returned a "no cause of action" 
verdict in Dejavue's favor. 
8. With respect to Plaintiff Nord's Intentional Infliction 
of Emotional Distress claim against Defendant, the jury returned 
a "no cause of action" verdict in U.S. Energy's favor. 
9. Based upon the Jury's verdict, che Court finds Dejavue 
to be the prevailing party in this matter. 
B. EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF FEE REQUEST 
10. In support of its Motion for An Award cf Attorneys' 
Fees and Costs to Prevailing Pariy 'hereinafter "Motion"), 
Dejavue submitted billing statements detailing and documenting 
the legal services provided by Dejavue's counsel in this matter, 
3 
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including the number of hours worked by each of Dejavue's 
attorneys, the type of work performed and the hourly fee charged 
by each attorney. 
11. Dejavue also submitted the Affidavits of Dejavue's 
attorneys, Walter F. Bugden, Jr., James E. Morton, Jeffrey S. 
Williams and Tara L. Isaacson, attesting to the accuracy of each 
respective attorney's billing statements and detailing the work 
performed by each attorney. 
12. Walter F. Bugden Jr. worked 3 55.58 hours, including 
trial time, at the rate of $175.00 for a total fee of $62,226.50; 
Mr. Morton spent 57.50 hours in litigating and preparing this 
case for trial, excluding his trial time, at the hourly rate of 
$175.00 for a total fee of $10,062.50; Mr. Williams spent 28.00 
hours in litigating and preparing this case for trial, excluding 
his trial time, at the hourly rate of $150.00 for a total fee of 
$4,200.00; associates Jacquelynn D. Carmichael and Tara L. 
Isaacson assisted in the preparation of this case for trial and 
spent 7 and 55.67 hours respectively at the hourly rates of 
$125.00 and $100.00, respectively, for total fees of $875.00 and 
$5,567.00 respectively. 
13. In support of its Motion, Dejavue also submitted the 
Affidavits of three local attorneys specializing in civil trial 
work, to wit: Brent V. Manning, Richard D. Burbidge and Robert 
A. Peterson. These Affiants each have between 20 and 26 years of 
civil trial experience. Based upon their experience in civil 
4 
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trial work, their extensive review of the billing statements of 
Dejavue's attorneys and their familiarity with the hourly rates 
charged by attorneys in this locality, these Affiants attested to 
the reasonableness of the hourly fees charge.d by Dejavue's 
respective counsel, the reasonableness of the number of hours -
expended by each attorney working on this case and the 
reasonableness of Dejavue's total attorneys' fee incurred in this 
matter. 
C. EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN OPPOSITION TO FEE REQUEST 
14. In response to Dejavue's Motion, Defendant failed to 
offer any evidence to refute the reasonableness of Dejavue's Fee 
Request, including the reasonableness of the amount of the hourly 
fees charged and/or the reasonableness of the number of hours 
expended by Dejavue's counsel in this matter. 
15. Instead, Defendant presented arguments that Dejavue was 
not the prevailing party in this matter and that the Sublease 
Agreement giving rise to this action did not provide a basis for 
Dejavue's recovery of its attorney's fees. 
D. ALLOCATION ISSUES AFFECTING FEE AWARD 
16. At the hearing on July 28, 1998, the Court instructed 
Dejavue to revise its'fee request to exclude Mr. Bugden's travel 
time to and from'Tiverton, Wyoming and/or Ticaboo, Utah and to 
exclude the trial fees generated by Mr. Bugden's two trial co-
counsel, Mr. Morton and Mr. Williams. 
5 
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17. The Court has reviewed Dejavue's "Revised Attorneys 
Fees and Costs Request11 (hereinafter "Revised Fee Request") and 
finds that the Request has been revised in accordance with the 
instructions given by the Court. 
18. In addition, the Court finds that Dejavue's counsel has 
subtracted from the Revised Fee Request those fees incurred for 
the preparation of Plaintiff Nord's unsuccessful Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress claim. 
19. With the exception of Plaintiff Nord's intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim, the claims advanced by 
Plaintiff Dejavue, and interposed as defenses to the 
counterclaims, were based on inter-related legal theories and 
arose from a common core of facts. 
20. In order to defend against the breach of contract 
counterclaim, Dejavue was entitled to show the fact-finder that 
Defendant, not Dejavue, breached the sub-lease agreement by 
forcibly evicting Dejavue, converting its property and unjustly 
benefitting from the eviction by using Dejavue's restaurant 
equipment for approximately two years. 
21. Evidence presented by Dejavue in defense of the 
counterclaims for breach of contract and conversion had a direct 
bearing on Dejavue's claims for eviction, conversion and breach 
of the sublease agreement which it asserted against Defendant. 
22. Each of Dejavue's claims submitted to the jury was 
intertwined with its defense of the breach of contract and 
6 
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conversion counterclaims and arose from a common core of facts. 
23. After examining the evidence submitted by Dejavue in 
support of its Revised Fee Request, including memoranda, billing 
statements, Affidavits of Dejavue's counsel and the Affidavits of 
Messrs. Manning, Burbidge and Peterson, the Court finds Dejavue's 
Revised Fee Request to be reasonable in every respect. 
E. FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING A "REASONABLE" FEE 
24. The factors considered by this Court in determining 
what constitutes a "reasonable" attorneys fee include the 
difficulty of the litigation; the efficiency of the attorneys in 
presenting the case; the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar services; the overall result attained and the 
expertise and experience of the attorneys involved. 
1- Difficulty of the Litigation. 
25. This case involved a claim by Plaintiff for seven 
separate causes of action against Defendant and a counterclaim by 
Defendant for four separate causes of action against Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's case involved complex commercial, contractual, 
landlord/tenant and tort issues and required its present counsel 
to do a great deal of legal work in a short,, very condensed 
period of time. 
26. The litigation of the subject matter was difficult due 
to the fact that Dejavue's counsel was retained on the f.ve of the 
originally scheduled trial date and the fact that Dejavue's 
counsel were required to do extensive pre-trial preparation, 
7 
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including drafting court submissions, amassing numerous 
documents, categorizing numerous documents, familiarizing 
themselves with over 400 pages of exhibits, organizing exhibit 
books for the jury and the Court, developing witness .testimony, 
arguing Summary Judgment motions and preparing for a five-day 
jury trial, all within a six-week period of time. 
27. Dejavue's lead counsel was required to immediately and 
completely immerse himself in the preparation of the case for 
trial, to the near exclusion of his other cases and clients. The 
amount of time and man-power required to prepare this case for 
trial was enormous because the case was document intensive, 
aggressively defended, and involved numerous percipient 
witnesses. 
2. Efficiency of Attorneys Presenting the Case. 
28. The Court finds that due to the complex and document-
intensive nature of the case, and the short time in which to 
prepare it for trial, Dejavue's lead counsel reasonably required 
the assistance of other lawyers in order to adequately prepare 
the case for trial. 
29. The number of hours expended by each of Dejavue's 
attorneys in preparing this case for trial was reasonable and 
necessary. 
30. The legal services and task^: performed by each of 
Dejavue's respective attorneys in preparing this case for trial 
were reasonable and necessary, 
8 
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31. Dejavue's attorneys were efficient in their division of 
labor and tasks and in the number of hours they spent in 
preparing this case for trial. 
32. The Court finds, however, that only one attorney was 
reasonably needed to represent Dejavue during the actual trial of 
this matter and limits Dejavue's recovery of its attorneys fees 
for trial time to the trial time of lead counsel, Walter F. 
Bugden, Jr. only. 
3. Customary Fee in Locality for Similar Services. 
33. The Court finds that the hourly fees charged by 
Dejavue's respective counsel, in the amounts of $175.00 for 
Messrs. Bugden and Morton; $150.00 for Mr. Williams and $100.00 
for Tara Isaacson are reasonable and customary in the Salt Lake 
City locality for the type of civil litigation and trial work 
performed in this matter. 
34. The Court acknowledges the Affidavits of Messrs. 
Manning, Burbidge and Peterson, recognizes these attorneys to be 
experienced civil litigation and trial attorneys with an 
awareness of the customary fees charged in this locality for the 
kind of work performed by Dejavue's counsel and finds their 
opinions, with respect to the reasonableness of the fees charged 
and work performed in this matter, to be helpful and valid. 
4. Overall Result Obtained. 
35. Dejavue's attorneys obtained a favorable result for 
their client. Specifically, Dej avue prevailed on its claims 
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against Defendant and received a jury verdict in its favor in the 
amount of $90,871.00 in compensatory damages. 
36. Dejavue's attorneys were also successful in defending 
Defendant's counterclaims which the Jury found to be non-
meritorious and rendered a verdict of "no cause of action" with 
respect to the same. 
37. Finally, Dejavue's attorneys prevailed in the punitive 
damages portion of the trial as well and obtained an award of 
$62,500.00 in punitive damages for their client. 
5. Experience and Expertise of Counsel. 
38. The Court further finds that the hourly fees charged by 
each of Dejavue's attorneys is reasonable based upon each 
attorney's respective level of litigation experience and 
expertise. Specifically, Mr. Bugden and Mr. Morton have 
extensive trial experience and have been practicing law for 21 
and 16 years respectively. An hourly fee of $175.00 is a 
reasonable fee for these experienced, seasoned lawyers. Mr. 
Williams, as a civil litigator of seven years is entitled to the 
reasonable hourly fee of $150.00 for his time, and Ms. Isaacson's 
reduced hourly fee of only $100.00 is reasonable for a litigation 
lawyer with two years of experience. 
39. The Court has reviewed Dejavue's "Revised Attorneys 
Fees and Costr Request1' itemizing Dejavue's attorneys' fees in 
the amount of $91,668.69 and finds the Fee Request to be 
reasonable and recoverable in its entirety. 
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BASED upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes the following Conclusions of Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. This matter is a civil action based upon a written 
contract that allows at least one party to recover its attorneys' " 
fees. 
2. Section 19.02 of the Sublease Agreement entered into by 
Dejavue, Inc. and U.S. Energy Corp. in conjunction with Utah Code 
Ann., §78-27-56.5 provides the legal basis for Dejavue's recovery 
of its attorneys' fees and costs in this matter. 
3. Plaintiff Dejavue, Inc. is the prevailing party in this 
matter; Dejavue prevailed on its claims against Defendant in 
achieving a Jury verdict in its favor in the amount of $90,871.00 
in compensatory damages and $62,500 in punitive damages, as well 
as in its defense of Defendant's breach of contract counterclaim, 
for which the Jury returned a finding of "no cause of action". 
4. The jury's verdict of "no cause of action" for the 
Defendant on its breach of contract counterclaim was, 
necessarily, a finding in favor of Plaintiff Dejavue, Inc. on its 
breach of contract claim. 
5. Plaintiff Dejavue, Inc. was the prevailing party on both 
its breach of. ccnt/act claim and in its defense of the 
Defendant's breach of contract counterclaim. 
6. Dejavue's claims against Defendant and Defendant's 
counterclaims against Plaintiff derive from a common core of 
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facts; as a result, the prosecution of Dejavue's claims 
necessarily intertwined and overlapped with its successful 
defense of Defendant's counterclaims. 
7. Due to the overlap of Dejavue's legal theories and the 
common core of facts giving rise to all of Dejavue's claims 
against Defendant, as well as Defendant's counterclaims against 
Dejavue, Dejavue is entitled to be compensated for the reasonable 
attorneys fees incurred in presenting all of its legal theories. 
8. Plaintiff Nord did not prevail on her intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim and is not entitled to 
recover her attorneys fees incurred in prosecuting that claim. 
9. The hourly rates charged by Dejavue's respective 
attorneys are reasonable based upon the experience and expertise 
of Dejavue's counsel, the customary rates charged in this 
locality, the overall result obtained, the difficulty of the 
litigation and the efficiency of Dejavue's counsel. 
10. The amount of work performed by Dejavue's counsel in 
this matter in prosecuting Dejavue's claims and in defending U.S. 
Energy's counterclaims was reasonable and necessary. 
11. Dejavue's Fee Request is reasonable in every respect 
and is adequately supported by the evidence submitted by counsel. 
.12. Dejavue, Inc. is entitled to and is hereby awarded its 
attorneys' fees in the amount of $91,668.69, and the Judgment 
entered herein on August 11, 1998 is hereby augmented in that 
amount. 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
V 
DATED this XL day of October, 1998. 
BY^HE COURT: 
/ HONO&AgLE H0ME^>1*ILKINS0N 
' T h i i ^ D i s t r i c t " Cxpugt|\ Judge 
w 
•) n 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; TUESDAY, JULY 28, 1998 
-000O000-
THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Roberts. 
MR. ROBERTS: Yeah, that sounds like Judge 
Wilkinson. How are you, sir? 
THE COURT: This is Judge Wilkinson, and 
Mr. Bugden is here in the office. 
MR. ROBERTS: All right. 
THE COURT: There's a number of motions which 
have been brought. I want to give you my rulings on them. 
I wanted to talk to you because there's going to be some 
further material which you people are going to have to — 
are going to go into. 
First of all, the question that came up as far as 
pre-judgment interest, the Court is of the opinion that the 
way the verdict was framed with the — the general verdict, 
that it did not break down as to what the damages were for. 
I know that the Utah law provides for pre-judgment interest 
on special damages and personal injury cases and that it 
would probably carry over to a case like this. This Court 
has no way of knowing what are special damages or what may 
be general damages. 
Therefore, the' Court would deny pre-judgment 
interest. But if we were to grant it, it would be at the 
rate of 10 per cent, which is the statutory rate. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The Court would grant post-judgment interest at 
the rate of 7.468 per cent, which is according to statute. 
MR. BUGDEN: What is that rate, Judge? 
THE COURT: 7.468. That's the — as set by 
statute, except the — that's just given to me. 
The Court would also grant to the plaintiff 
attorney fees. But the Court would also put the 
responsibility on the defense to raise issues as far as 
what attorney fees are good and what are not good. In 
other words, the Court is looking at this: 
The Court would not grant attorney fees for the 
representation of Nord. That was not under contract, and 
attorney fees can only be awarded by contract, and that was 
for Dejavue. The Court would also not be inclined to award 
attorney fees for three attorneys sitting five days at 
trial. The Court would also not be inclined to award 
attorney fees for the time Mr. Bugden spent while traveling 
to and from Ticaboo and so forth and whatever took place 
there. And that's something that, as I say, counsel, 
Mr. Roberts, you're going to have to go into this affidavit 
and give the Court some direction on it. 
MR. ROBERTS: All right, sir, 
THE COURT: The Court would also award to the 
plaintiff taxable costs. And taxable costs, those that are 
awarded by statute are, of course, case law. The Court is 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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not inclined and, again, I put the burden on the defense to 
go over the cost bill and to give any objection. But the 
Court's not inclined to award expert witness fees, just be 
the statutory fee. The Court would want more information 
as to the attorney fees and the cost involved by Richards, 
Brandt and — and whatever the rest of the name is. The 
firm that was in the case before. 
The Court would also not be inclined to award 
costs for the travel and the meals and the lodging, the 
expenses involved in the travel to Ticaboo and Riverton and 
so forth. The Court would also not be inclined to award 
attorney fees for the investigation fee. 
Now, there may be others, but those are just the 
ones that I just looked at that do not — that are not just 
under — they're not under the taxable costs. 
The Court would also deny the defendant's motions 
for sanctions. 
Any questions? 
MR. ROBERTS: Judge, have you entered a judgment 
yet on the case? I understand you have not. 
THE COURT: I have not. 
MR. ROBERTS: Okay. Would you be waiting until 
after we finish this process before you do that? 
THE COURT: Well — 
MR. ROBERTS: I just want to make sure we don't 
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get — I don't get particularly cross-wise with the timing 
and everything. 
THE COURT: Well, in cases, many times, where 
disputes come up, I tell counsel that if they want the 
post-judgment interest to commence to run, I will enter 
judgment for the amount of which the jury awarded, that all 
other amounts would be added to it, such as costs and — 
and attorney fees. And, of course, the post-judgment 
interest would not run on that anyway. Therefore, the 
judgment could be entered but the other matters would be 
resolved as you get some time to give me some law on them. 
MR. ROBERTS: Okay. So — okay. Then I guess we 
just wait until we hear from you or — whether the 
plaintiffs want to have it done right away. 
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Bugden's here. 
MR. BUGDEN: Well, we will. I'll prepare a 
judgment. 
THE COURT: Then just a judgment as far as the 
verdict of the jury, that alone, and the Court will execute 
it as soon as that comes in. And then I will wait to hear 
from you as far as anything as far as attorney fees or as 
far as costs. 
And I hope, counsel, please, I know you've had 
your differences, but I hope that you can talk a little bit 
about this and resolve one of these matters without the 
6 
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Court's getting involved in it. Because a lot of these 
matters are — are statutory case law as far as what 
attorney fees can be granted and what costs can be granted. 
MR. ROBERTS: Okay, Judge. 
THE COURT: But who's going to prepare an order 
for this hearing? 
MR. BUGDEN: I will. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any other questions? 
MR. ROBERTS: No. And I would just ask that any 
orders that Mr. Bugden's office prepares be sent to me, 
faxed, preferably. 
THE COURT: Now, I'm sure he will do that. But I 
will — and I'm telling Mr. Bugden now to prepare the 
judgment just as the jury verdict, and I will execute that 
as soon as that comes in, if that meets with the Court's 
approval. 
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ROBERTS: All right. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Roberts. 
Thank you, Mr. Bugden. Any questions? 
MR. BUGDEN: Yeah. Actually, could you tell me 
again, so I understand, why you're not going to award pre-
judgment interest? 
THE COURT: Because I think pre-judgment interest 
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can only be awarded on special damages and that — that — 
and that's taken from the — there's a statute, see, for 
personal injury cases, pre-judgment interest can be awarded 
on special damages. 
MR. BUGDEN: Okay. 
THE COURT: And this, I don't know what's special 
damages and what are general damages. 
MR- BUGDEN: Okay. Thanks. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Whereupon, the hearing was concluded.) 
-000O000-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
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GENERAL VERDICT 
Civil No. 960902865 
Honorable Judge Wilkinson 
DEJAVUE, lEKTTUTaTrcoTporation, 
KR4ST4N£-G^£CHUtT-Z and ALLISON 
NORD, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
U.S. ENERGY CORP., a Wyoming 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
-ooOoo— 
We, the jury in the above-entitled action, find in favor of the plaintiff Allison Nord 
and against the defendant, and assess the plaintiffs damages at S £) . 
DATED this \] ^ day of June, 1998. 
BY 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT , 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, COUNTY OF UTAH ^ ; 2 ®98 
DEJAVUE, INC., a Utah, corporation, 
KRISTINE C. SCHULTZ and, 
ALLISON NORD 
GENERAL 
DEFENDANT 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
U.S. ENERGY CORP., a Wyoming corporation, Civil No. 960902865CV 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
We, the jury duly impaneled in the above entitled action, find the issues in favor 
of the defendant and award damages in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs 
in the sum of $ Q) . 
Dated this /Z- day of June, 1998 
Foreperson 
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DEJAVUE, INC. a Utah corporation, 
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CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS 
ASSETS 
May 31, 
CURRENT ASSETS: 
Cash and cash equivalents 
Accounts and notes receivable (Note C): 
Trade, net of allowance for doubtful 
accounts of $30,900 and $27,800, respectively 
Related parties (Note C) 
Current portion of long-term 
notes receivable (Notes F and L ) 
Assets held for resale and other 
Inventory 
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 
INVESTMENTS AND ADVANCES (Notes E and F): 
Affiliates 
Restricted investments 
INVESTMENT IN CONTINGENT STOCK 
PURCHASE WARRANT (Note F) 
PROPERTIES AND EQUIPMENT (Notes B, C, D and F): 
Land and mobile home park 
Buildings and improvements 
Aircraft and related equipment 
Developed oil and gas properties, full cost method 
Undeveloped gas properties 
Mineral properties and mine development costs 
Less accumulated depreciation, depletion 
and amortization 
OTHER ASSETS: 
Accounts and notes receivable: 
Real estate sales, net of valuation 
allowance of S926.300 at 
May 31,1997 (Notes F and L) 
Employees (Note C) 
Other 
Deposits and other 
1997 
$ 1,416.900 
368.200 
1,191.000 
337,200 
991,600 
96.000 
4,400,900 
4,999,600 
8.506 300 
13,505,900 
4.594.000 
939,000 
5,986,800 
5.627,900 
1,769.900 
519.400 
14.843.00H 
(8.802.100) 
6,040,900 
1996 
S 992.600 
570.900 
281.800 
438,700 
509,700 
118.700 
2,912,400 
3.658.500 
8.200.800 
11,859.300 
--
939,000 
6,243,100 
6,650,100 
1,769,800 
135.400 
10.956.900 
?6,694,300 
(9.047.900) 
17,646,400 
394,000 
745,300 
338,600 
36/.500 
974,200 
532,400 
674,700 
193.900 
1.845.400 2.375.200 
30.387.100 34793.300 
accompanying notes to consolidated financial statements are an intesral oart of these balance sheets. 
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US. ENERGY CORP. AND AFFILIATES 
C O N S O L I D A T E D B A L A N C E S H E E T S 
LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY 
May 31. 
1997 
S 1.312,600 
81.300 
1.393,900 
183.100 
8.751.800 
5.259.000 
183.300 
199i 
$ 1.292.300 
499.000 
239.900 
2,031.200 
444,300 
3,978,800 
10,414,300 
183.300 
CURRENT LIABILITIES: 
Accounts payable and accrued expenses 
Lines of credit (Note G; 
Current portion of long-term debt (Note G) 
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 
LONG-TERM DEBT (Note G) 
RECLAMATION LIABILITY (Notes F and K) 
OTHER ACCRUED LIABILITIES (Note F) 
DEFERRED TAX LIABILITY (Note H) 
COMMITMENTS AND CONTINGENCIES (Ncie K) 
MINORITY INTERESTS - 1,637,900 
FORFEITABLE COMMON STOCK. 
S.01 par value, issued 223.900 and 
195,520 shares, respectively, forfeitable 
until earned (Note J) 1.892.400 1.486,500 
SHAREHOLDERS'EQUITY (Note J): 
Preferred stock. S01 par value: autho-lzed. 
100,000 shares; none issued or outstanding 
Common stock. S.01 par value; authorized, 
20,000.000 shares; issued 6,646.475 and 
6.324,306 shares, respectively 
Additional paid-in capital 
Accumulated deficit 
Treasury stock at cost. 690,943 and 
769,943 shares, respectively (2,182,000) (2,242,400) 
Unallocated ESOP contribution (927.000) (927.000) 
12.723.600 14.617.000 
S 30.387.100 S 34.793.300 
66.500 
22.543.000 
(6.776.900) 
63,100 
20.775.700 
(3,052,400) 
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CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS 
REVENUES: 
Mineral sales and option (Note E) 
Construction contract revenues 
Commercial operations 
Distribution from affiliate in excess of cost basis 
Oil sales 
Gain on sales of assets (Notes D and F) 
Royalties from mineral properties agreements (Note F) 
Interest 
Management fees and other (Note C) 
COSTS AND EXPENSES: 
Cost of minerals sold 
Mineral operations 
Construction costs 
Commercial operations 
Oil production 
Provision (or doubtful accounts 
General and administrative 
Gas operations 
Abandonment of mineral interests 
Loss on sale of investments 
Interest 
LOSS BEFORE MINORITY INTEREST IN LOSS. EQUITY IN 
LOSS OF AFFILIATES AND INCOME TAXES 
MINORITY INTEREST IN LOSS OF CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES 
EQUITY IN LOSS OF AFFILIATES 
LOSS BEFORE INCOME TAXES S (3.724.500) S (2.333.900) S (2,366,800) 
INCOME TAXES (Note H) -JL_ - - _ -_ 
1997 
$ 
1,038.600 
2.219,400 
1.003.800 
164.600 
39.400 
207.300 
693,300 
423.800 
5.790.200 
— 
843.100 
752,600 
3.059.600 
96.800 
614.200 
2,763.300 
-
1.225.800 
-
140.800 
9.496.200 
(3.706.000) 
672.300 
(690.800) 
Year Ended May 31. 
1996 
$ 3.116.700 S 
3.794.500 
1.439.100 
— 
210.100 
352.200 
-
619.400 
100.200 
9.632.200 
2.766.700 
805.600 
3.077,800 
! 2.374.800 
73,000 
— 
2,524.700 
~ 
328,700 
-
205.000 
12.156.300 
(2.524.100) 
608.700 
(418.500) 
1995 
1.303.400 
1.177.600 
_ 
194.500 
1.282.400 
85.500 
469,900 
87.300 
4.600.600 
•• 
1.654,300 
1,038,300 
2.070,100 
78,100 
— 
1,860.600 
206.600 
— 
90.000 
180.300 
7.178.300 
(2.577,700) 
653,200 
(442.300) 
LOSS BEFORE DISCONTINUED OPERATIONS (3.724,500) (2.333.900) (2,366,800) 
DISCONTINUED OPERATIONS: 
Income from discontinued operations. 
net of income taxes of $0 - 308.900 296,200 
Gain on disposal of subsidiary operations in discontinued 
segment, net of income taxes of S50.000 .. 2.295.700 
NET INCOME (LOSS)
 s (3.724,500) 
INCOME (LOSS) PER SHARE AMOUNTS: 
Loss before discontinued operations $ (.55) 
Income from discontinued operations .. 
Gain on disposal of subsidiary 
operating in discontinued segment . , 
WET INCOME (LOSS) PER SHARE $ ^ 
L IGHTED AVERAGE SHARES OUTSTANDING 6798.458 
The accompanying notes to consolidated financial statements are an integral nart of these balance sheets. 
s_. 
s 
L_ 
270.700 
(38) 
.05 
M 
M 
6.218.184 
L_ 
s 
i_ 
(2.070,600) 
(.48) 
.06 
Ld2) 
4.977.050 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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US. ENERGY CORP. AND AFFILIATES 
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY 
Balance May 31.1994 
Funding of ESOP 
Issuance of common stock 
through private placement 
(Note J) 
Issuance of common stock 
to third party for 
services rendered 
Issuance of common stock 
for exercised option 
Issuance of common stock 
to buyout third party 
in property venture 
Wet loss 
Balance May 31.1995 
Funding ot ESOP 
Issuance of common stock 
through private placement 
Issuance of additional common 
shares in connection 
ivith prior year 
private placement 
Cancellation of common stock 
issued for services rendered 
Issuance of common stock to 
employees for a bonus 
Issuance of common stock for 
exercised warrants 
Fair value of warrants issued 
above exercise price 
Issuance of common stock for 
exercised option 
Dilution of investment 
in subsidiary 
Met income (loss) 
Balance. May 31.1996 
Funding of ESOP 
Issuance of common stock lor 
exercised warrants 
Fair value of warrants issued 
above exercise price 
Issuance of common stock 
for services rendered 
Issuance of common stock for 
exercised option 
Purchase of treasury stock 
Shares of USE stock 
held by subsidiary 
no longer consolidated 
Met loss 
Common Stock 
Shares Amount 
Additional (Accumulated 
Paid-in Deficit) 
Capital Earnings 
4,693,090 S 46.800 S16,784.800 $ (1,185.800) 
37,204 400 199,600 
4.000 1.196.000 
23.100 
1.100 345.700 
200 79.800 
400.000 
5.000 
107,500 
20.000 
^ ^_ ;!_ (2 070 600) 
5.262.794 S 52.533 S18.629.000 $ (3.256.400) 
812.432 
133.336 
(5.000) 
32.901 
81.243 
6.600 
8.100 2.634.100 
i 300 
533 
£33 
"00 
65.400 
(23.100) 
180.600 
389.100 
41.700 
41.400 
(1.382.500) 
(66,700) 
270.700 
6.324,306 S 63.100 $20,775,700 S (3.052.400) 
24.069 200 213.400 
180,000 
12,000 
106,100 
1.800 
200 
1,200 
898.200 
148.300 
138,300 
369.100 
(3.724.500) 
Shares 
Treasury Stock 
Amount 
Unallocated 
ESOP 
Contribution 
Total 
Shareholders' 
Equity, 
713.276 $ (2.072.400) $ (1,014.300) S12.559.100 
200,000 
56.667 (170,000) 1,030,000 
23.100 
346,800 
80.000 
:i_ n_ r_ (2070600) 
769943 S (2.242.400) $ (1.014.300) S12.168.400 
87.300 87,300 
2.842,200 
769.943 $ (2,242,400) S 
21,000 
(100.000) 
(235.600) 
296.000 
(23.100) 
180.900 
389.900 
41.700 
41.500 
(1.382.500) 
- 270.700 
(927,000) $14,617,000 
213.600 
900.000 
148,300 
138.500 
370.300 
(235.600) 
296.000 
3.724.500) 
Balance,May31.1997 6 646.475 S 66500 $22543000 $ (6776.900) 690.943 $ (2.182 000) $ (927.000) $12 723.600 
StBTetioldeTs' Equity at May 3i. 1997 does not include 223.900 shares currently issued but forfeitable if certain conditions are not met by the recipients. However, both the 
•Outstanding Sna-es a: Sepier-fte-12.1997" on the cover &--. and the "Weighted Average Shares Outstanding' on the Consolidated Statement of Operations include the forfeitable 
St»rPS T ^ W lA«f> line ilemc 3>co Jnrl,,Hc m f t C1C n o r - i .« 
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CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS 
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES: 
Net income (loss) 
Adjustments to reconcile net income (loss) to net cash 
used in operating activities: 
Minority interest in loss of 
consolidated subsidiaries 
Income from discontinued operations 
Depreciation, depletion and amortization 
Abandoned mineral claims 
Equity in loss from affiliates 
Distribution from affiliate in excess of cost basis 
Gain on sale of assets 
Provision for doubtful accounts 
Loss on sale of marketable 
equity securities 
Gain on sale of subsidiary 
Non-cash proceeds from sale of subsidiary 
Common stock issued to fund ESOP 
Non-cash compensation 
Common stock and warrants issued for services 
Other 
Net changes in: 
Accounts receivable 
Other assets 
Accounts payable and accrued expenses 
Reclamation and other liabilities 
Deferred tax liability 
NET CASH USED IN OPERATING ACTIVITIES 
CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES: 
Development of mining properties 
Development of gas properties 
Proceeds from sale of subsidiary 
Proceeds from sale of property and equipment 
Proceeds from sale of investments 
Purchases of property and equipment 
Changes in notes receivable, net 
Distribution from affiliate 
Investments in affiliates 
Reduction in cash due to deconsolidation of subsidiary 
NET CASH (USED IN) PROVIDED dY 
INVESTING ACTIVITIES 
1997 
$ (3,724,500) 
(672.300) 
-
658.900 
1,225,800 
690,800 
(1,003,800) 
(39,400) 
614,200. 
._ 
— 
— 
213,600 
405,900 
286,800 
150,600 
(706,500) 
(724,100) 
331,700 
(355,300) 
— 
(2.647.600) 
(719,300) 
(29,100) 
— 
273,500 
— 
(208.600) 
(121.400) 
4.367.000 
(1.413.700) 
(484.100) 
1.664.300 
Year Ended May 31. 
1996 
$ 270.700 
(608.700) 
(308,900) 
788,500 
328.700 
418,500 
~ 
(352,200) 
— 
(2,295,700) 
607,900 
87,300 
339,100 
(23,100) 
(455,600) 
88,600 
(520,300) 
(774,700) 
(377,400) 
— 
(2.787.300) 
(763.000) 
(42,100) 
3,300,000 
1,212,900 
— 
(1.387.300) 
(1,102,800) 
— 
(676,500) 
— 
541.200 
1995 
$ (2.070.600) 
(653.200) 
(296,200) 
724.700 
— 
442,300 
--
(1.282.400) 
— 
90,000. 
-
— 
200.000 
69.500 
23.100 
(219,000) 
(415,700) 
(96,000) 
1,557,700 
(412,600) 
(117.500) 
(2.455.900) 
(455,100) 
(218,200) 
— 
854,300 
199,300 
(124.200) 
91,800 
-
(627.500) 
— 
(279.600) 
(Continued) 
The accompanying notes to consolidated financial statements are an integral part of these balance sheets. 
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US- ENERGY CORP. AND AFFILIATES 
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS 
(continued) 
CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES: 
Proceeds from issuance of common stock 
Proceeds from subsidiary .stock sale 
Proceeds from long-term debt-
Net (repayments on) proceeds from lines of credit 
Purchase of treasury stock 
Repayments of long-term debt 
NET CASH PROVIDED BY (USED IN) 
FINANCING ACTIVITIES 
NET INCREASE (DECREASE) IN CASH AND 
CASH EQUIVALENTS 
CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS. Beginning of year 
CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS, End of year 
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURES: 
Interest paid 
Income faxes paid 
NON-CASH INVESTING AND FINANCING ACTIVITIES: 
Notes received for sale of assets 
Exchange of common shares 
investment in affiliate in exchange 
for investment in Contingent Stock 
Purchase Warrant 
Issuance of common stock to acquire affiliate 
Deconsolidation of subsidiary in 1997: 
Other assets 
Investment in affiliates 
Restricted investment 
Property, plant and equipment 
Notes payable 
Accounts payable and accrued expenses 
Minority Interest 
1997"" 
$ 1,270,300 
1,106,700 
554.400 
(499,000) 
(235.600) 
(789.200) 
Year Ended May 31, 
1996" 
$ 3,273,600 
4,212,800 
(641,000) 
(3.967.300) 
1335 
$ 1,376,800 
626,400 
1,140,000 
(935.300) 
1.407.600 
424.300 
992.600 
S 1.416.900 
S 4.594000 
2.878.100 
632,000 
360.600 
992.600 
$ 77,600 S 
355.000 
27,000 
11,560,600 
185.000 
433.900 
2,069,900 
2.207.900 
(527,600) 
888.200 
S 360.600 
$ 118.900 $ 205.000 $ 160.200 
$ 1.000.000 $ 1.550.000 
$ 80.000 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TICABOO SHOPPING CENTER 
SUBLEASE AGREEMENT 
(RESTAURANT & LOUNGE) 
TENANT: Dejavue Inc. 
DATE: May 1, 1995 
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SUBLEASE AGREEMENT 
THIS SUBLEASE AGREEMENT is made and entered into this 1st day of May, 1995 by and 
between Canyon Homesteads, Inc. a Utah corporation, as Trustee for the Ticaboo Townsite Joint 
Venture, hereinafter referred to as the "Landlord," and Dejavue, Inc., hereinafter referred to 
as the "Tenant". 
RECITALS 
A. On the 15th day of September, 1980, the State of Utah, acting through the 
Department of Natural Resources, Division of State Lands, now called School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Administration ("SITLA") and the Landlord entered into a certain Special Use 
Lease Agreement No. 399 (hereinafter the "Base Lease"), whereby the State of Utah leased to 
the Landlord certain real propeny (hereinafter the "Shopping Center Property") situated in 
Garfield County, State of Utah, and more particularly described in Exhibit A attached hereto and 
by this reference made a pan hereof. 
B. The Landlord plans to lease a ponion of the Shopping Center Propeny (hereinafter 
the "Ticaboo Shopping Center"). 
C. The Tenant desires to Lease from the Landlord cenain commercial space in a 
building at the Ticaboo Shopping Center for the purpose of operating a restaurant and liquor 
lounge, and the Landlord is willing to lease such Space to the Tenant, all on the terms, 
covenants, and conditions hereinafter set forth. 
NOV/, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements .herein 
contained, the Landlord and the Tenant agree as follows: 
1. PREMISES. EQUIPMENT AND HARDWARE . . 
1.01. Description of Premises, Equipment and Hardware. For and in consideration of 
the rents^  herein reserved and the covenants and agreements herein contained on the pan of the 
Tenant to be performed or observed, the Landlord hereby leases and demises to the Tenant, 
cenain premises (hereinafter the "Premises") comprising of approximately 4,500 square feet of 
floor space in a building and approximately 1,600 square fcec of outdoor patio space adjoining 
the same 'building at the Ticaboo Shopping Center, and certain equipment and hardware 
(hereinafter referred to as "Restaurant Inventory") for use at and in conjunction with the 
Tenant's business at the Premise.* The Premises are shown and cross-hatched in red on the site 
plan attached hereto as Exhibit B and the floor plan attached hereto as Exhibit C, both of which 
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part thereof, without the prior written consent of the Landlord and SITLA in each specific 
Instance. Any attempt by the Tenant to assign or encumber its rights in this Sublease or in the 
Premises or to let or sublet the Premises or any pan thereof, without the prior written consent 
of the Landlord and SITLA, shall be voidable and, at the Landlord's election, shall constitute 
a default by the Tenant under this Sublease. Such prohibition against assigning and subletting 
shall include any assignment or subletting by operation of law. No consent to any assignment, 
encumbrance, or subletting shalfconstitute a waiver or consent as to any subsequent or further 
assignment, encumbrance, or subletting. 
18.02. Other Transfers. If the Tenant is a corporation, unincorporated association, or 
partnership, then the merger, consolidation, dissolution, liquidadon, withdrawal of partner, or 
other reorganization of the Tenant, or the sale, issuance, or other transfer in the aggregate of 
a controlling percentage of the capital stock or interest in the Tenant, or the sale of more than 
fifty percent(50%) of the value of the Tenant's assets, shall be deemed to be an assignment of 
this Sublease for purposed of Section 18.01 above. The phrase "controlling percentage" shall 
mean (i) if the Tenant is an unincorporated association or partnership, more than fifty percent 
(50 7o) of the total outstanding interests in the Tenant, or (ii) if the Tenant is a corporation, stock 
possessing more than fifty percent (50%) of the total combined voting power of all classes of 
the Tenant's issued and outstanding capital stock entitled to vote for the election of directors. 
18.03. No Concessions. The Tenant shall not have the right to permit any business to 
be operated in, at, or from the Premises by any concessionaire or licensee, without the prior 
written consent of the Landlord and SITLA in each specific instance. 
18.04. No Release of Tenant. No consent by the Landlord to any assignment, 
encumbrance, subletting, concession, or license shall relieve the Tenant from any obligation or-
liability of the Tenant under this Sublease, whether accruing before or after such consent, 
assignment, subletting, concession, or license. The Landlord's acceptance of rent hereunder 
from any party other than the Tenant shall in no event be deemed to be a waiver by the Landlord 
and SITLA, of any provision of this Sublease or to be a consent to any assignment, 
encumbrance, subletting, or other transfer. 
19. DEFAULT AND REMEDIES. 
19.01. Default bv Tenant. Upon the occurrence of any of the following events, the 
Tenant shall be in default under this Sublease: 
(a) Any failure by the Tenant to pay any rent, additional rent, or other amount 
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to be paid by the Tenant hereunder when due or within ten (10) days thereafter. 
(b) Any failure by the Tenant to observe or perform any terms, covenants, or 
conditions of this Sublease to be observed or performed by the Tenant, if such failure shall 
continue for thirty (30) days after written notice thereof to the Tenant; provided, however, that ' 
if the nature of the default is such that the same cannot reasonably be cured within said thirty 
.(30) day period, the Tenant shall not be in default hereunder if the Tenant shall within such 
period commence such cure and thereafter diligently prosecute the same to completion. 
(c) Any abandonment or vacation of the Premises by the Tenant. However, 
Tenant may vacate or abandon the premises during the Non-Acuve season as defined in 
paragraph 2.03 and the same will not constitute a breach of default under the terms of this 
agreement. However, prior to leaving the premises, the Tenant shall notify Landlord in writing 
that Tenant will return for the Active season as defined in paragraph 2.03. 
(d) The making by the Tenant of any general assignment or arrangement for 
the benefit of creditors; the filing by or against the Tenant of a petition to have the Tenant 
adjudged a bankrupt or for reorganization or arrangement under any law relating to bankruptcy; 
the appointment of a trustee or receiver to take possession of substantially all of the Tenant's 
assets located in the Premises or the Tenant's assets located in the Premises or of the Tenant's 
interest in this Sublease. 
19.02. Nonexclusive Remedies. In the event of any default under this Sublease by the 
Tenant, the Landlord shall have the following nonexclusive remedies: 
(a) At its opdon and without waiving any default by the Tenant, the Landlord 
shall have the right to continue this Sublease in full force and effect and to collect all rent, 
additional rent, and other amounts to be paid by the Tenant hereunder as and when due. During 
any period that the Tenant is in default hereunder, ihe Landlord shall have the right, pursuant 
to legal proceedings or pursuant to any notice provided for by law, to enter and take possession 
of the Premises, without terminating this Sublease, for the purpose of reletting said Premises or 
any part thereof and making any alterations and repairs that may be necessary or desirable in 
connection with such reletting. Any such reletting or relettings may be for such term or terms 
(including periods that would exceed the remaining term hereof), and at such rent or rents, and 
upon such other terms and condition as the Landlord may in its sole discretion deem advisable. 
Upon each and any such reletting,'the rent or rents received by the Landlord from such reletting 
shall be applied as follows: First to the payment of any indebtedness (other than rent) due 
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'hereunder from the Tenant to the Landlord; second, to the payment of costs and expenses of 
recovering possession of the Premises and such reletting, including brokerage fees, reasonable 
attorneys' fees, court costs, and costs of any alterations or repairs; third, to the payment of rent, 
additional rent, and other amounts due and unpaid hereunder; and fourth, the residue, if any, 
shall be held by the Landlord and applied in payment of future rent, additional rent, and other 
amounts as the same become due and payable hereunder. If the rent or rents received during 
any month and applied as provided above shall be insufficient to cover all such amounts 
including the rent, additional rent, and other amounts to be paid hereunder by the Tenant for 
such month, the Tenant shall pay to the Landlord any such deficiency; such deficiencies shall 
be calculated and paid monthly. No entry or taking possession of the Premises by the Landlord 
shall be construed as an election by the Landlord to terminate this Sublease, unless the Landlord 
gives written notice of such election to the Tenant or unless such termination shall be decreed 
by a court of competent jurisdiction. Notwithstanding any reletting by the Landlord without 
termination, the Landlord may at any time thereafter terminate this Sublease for such previous 
default by giving written notice thereof to the Tenant. 
(b) The Landlord shall have the right at its option to terminate this Sublease 
and the Tenant's right to possession hereunder by giving notice thereof to the Tenant, in which 
case this Sublease shall terminate and the Tenant shall immediately surrender possession of the 
Premises to the Landlord. In such event the Landlord shall be entitled to recover from the 
Tenant all damages incurred by .the Landlord by reason of the Tenant's default, including 
without limitation the following: (i) All unpaid rent which had been earned at the time of such 
termination (together with interest thereon at the rate of one and on-half percent (1.5%) per 
month to the time of award); plus (ii) the amount by which the unpaid rent which would have 
been earned after termination until the time of the award (together with interest thereon at the 
rate of one and one-half percent (1.5%) per month to the'time of award) exceeds the amount of 
such rental loss that is proved could have been reasonably avoided; plus (iii) the worth at the 
time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent for the balance of the term after the time 
of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that is proved could be reasonably avoided; plus 
(iv) any other amount necessary to compensate the Landlord for all detriment proximately caused 
by the Tenant's' failure to perform its obligations under this Sublease or which in the ordinary 
course of things would be likely, to result therefrom; plus (v) the amount of all costs and 
expenses, including court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred by the Landlord in 
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recovering possession of the Premises and damages incurred by the Landlord; plus (vi) at the 
Landlord's election, such other amounts in addition to or in lieu of the foregoing as may be 
permitted from time to time by applicable law. The "wonh at the time of award" shall be 
computed by discounting the involved amount at the discount rate of the U.S. Federal Reserve 
Bank at the time of award plus one percent (1%). 
19.03. Waiver of Redemption Rights. The Tenant hereby expressly waives any and all 
rights of redemption granted by or under present or future laws in the event of the Tenant being 
evicted or dispossessed for any cause, or in the event of the Landlord's obtaining possession of 
the Premises by reason of the Tenant's violation of any of the terms, covenants, or conditions 
of this Sublease or otherwise. 
19.04. Additional Remedies. In addition to the nonexclusive remedies provided in this 
Section 19, the Landlord shall have all remedies now or hereafter provided by law for enforcing, 
the provisions of this Sublease and the Landlord's rights hereunder.. In the event of any default 
hereunder by the Tenant, the Landlord shall be entitled to recover from the Tenant all costs and 
expenses (including reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs) incurred by the Landlord, with 
or without suit, in obtaining possession of the Premises, in collecting any rent, additional rent, 
or other amount due hereunder, .or in enforcing or interpreting the'provisions of this Sublease 
or any right of the Landlord hereunder. 
•20. ATTORNMENT AND SUBORDINATION. 
20.01. Estoppel Certificates. The Tenant shall from time to time, within ten (10) days 
after written request therefor from the Landlord, execute, acknowledge, and deliver to the 
Landlord a statement in writing (i) certifying that this Sublease is unmodified and in full force 
and effect (or, if modified, stating the nature of such modification and certifying that this 
Sublease as so modified is in* full force and effect), and (ii)certifying the date to which rent and 
other charges are paid in advance, if any, (Hi) acknowledging that there are no uncured defaults 
under this Sublease on the pan of the Landlord (or specifying such defaults if any are claimed), 
and (iv) verifying such other information ?^  the Landlord may reasonably request. Any such 
statement may be conclusively relied upon by any prospective purchaser or encumbrancer of the 
Premises or the Ticaboo Shopping Center. 
20.02. Transfer of Landlord's Interest. In the event of a sale or conveyance by the 
Landlord of Landlord's interest in the Premises other than a transfer for security purposes only. 
the Landlord shall notify the Tenant thereof and shall be relieved (from and after the date 
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78-17-4. Determination of causation — Compensation al-
lowed. 
(1) Causation of radiological injury from a nuclear incident shall be deter-
mined by the trier of fact, taking into account epidemiological studies, 
statistical probabilities, and other pertinent medical and scientific evidence. 
(2) A claimant under this chapter shall be entitled to full compensation of 
the claimant's radiological injuries if the trier of fact determines that it is more 
likely than not that such injuries resulted from the nuclear incident. 
History: C. 1953, 78-17-4, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 143, } 5. 
CHAPTER 18 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS 
Section 
78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages 
awards — Section inapplicable 
to DUI cases — Division of 
award with state. 
Section 
78-18-2. Drug exception. 
78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards — Section 
inapplicable to DUI cases — Division of award 
with state. 
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be 
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is 
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of 
the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. 
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and standards of conduct of 
Subsection (l)(a) do not apply to any claim for punitive damages arising 
out of the tortfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle while voluntarily 
intoxicated or under the influence of any drug or combination of alcohol 
and drugs as prohibited by Section 41-6-44. 
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16 regarding 
shoplifting is not subject to the prior award of compensatory or general" 
damages under Subsection (l)(a) whether or not restitution has been paid 
to the merchant prior to or as a part of a civil action under Section 78-11-15 
or 78-11-16. 
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible 
only after a finding of liability for punitive damages has been made. 
(3) In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and paid, 50% of 
the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after payment 
of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the state treasurer for deposit into 
the General Fund. 
History: C. 1953, 78-18-1, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 237, { 1; 1991, ch. 6, § 4. 
Applicability. - Laws 1969, ch. 237, § 4 
provides that the act applies to all claims for 
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78-27-56.5 JUDICIAL CODE 
(Utah 1987); Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); O'Brien v. Rush, 744 R2d 
306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); DeBry v. Occiden-
tal/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank, 754 P.2d 60 (Utah 
1988); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 
(Utah Ct. App. 1969); Cascade Energy & Metals 
Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1990): 
Burns Chiropractic Clinic •*. A Estate Tns.'Oo., 
851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). • •' 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Attorneys Fees in 
Utah. 19S4 Utah L. Rev. 553. 
Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless Ac-
tions, 1964 Utah L. Rev. 593. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Legis-
lative Enactments — Attorney's Fees, 19S9 
Utah L. Rev. 342. 
Note, "The Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress: A New Cause of Action in Utah," 1989 
Utah L. Rev. 571. 
A.L.R. — Construction and application of 
state statute or rule subjecting party making 
untrue allegations or denials to payment of 
costs or attorneys' fees, 6S A.L.R.3d 209. 
Attorneys'fees as recoverable in fraud action, 
44 A.L.R.4th 776. 
Attorneys* fees: obduracy as basis for state-
court award, 49 A.L.R.4th 825. 
Attorney's liability under state law for oppos-
ing parry's counsel fees, 56 A.L.R.4th 486. 
Recover}* of attorneys'fees and costs of litiga-
tion incurred as result of breach of agreement 
not to sue, 9 A.L.R.oth 933. 
Award of counsel fees to prevailing party 
based on adversary's bad faith, obduracy, or 
other misconduct, 31 A.L.R. Fed. 633. 
78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees — Reciprocal rights to recover 
attorney's fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in 
a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory 
note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorney's fees. 
History: C. 1953, 76-27-56.5, enacted bv L. 
1986, ch. 79, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Discretion of court. 
Cited. 
Discretion of court. 
In an action involving claims for breach of 
warranty, misrepresentation, and mutual mis-
take, where the only claim stemmed from the 
contract, it was not an abuse of discretion for 
the trial court to determine not to attempt to 
allocate the attorneys fees and denial of attor-
ney fees was aopropriate. Schafir v. Harrigan, 
879 P.2d 1384 'Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Cited in Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 
1292 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Saunders v. Sharp. 
840 P.2d 796 fUtah Ct. App. 1992J. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. - Attorney's liability under state law 
for opposing party's counsel fees, 56 A.L.R.4th 
486. 
Excessiveness or adequacy of attorneys' fees 
in matters involving real estate, 10 A.L.R.5th 
448. 
470 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
